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FEDERAL COURTS, PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
GETTING INTO EQUITY
Samuel L. Bray* & Paul B. Miller**
For two centuries, common lawyers have talked about a “cause of action.” But
“cause of action” is not an organizing principle for equity. This Article shows how a
plaintiff gets into equity, and it explains that equity is shaped by the interplay of its
remedial, procedural, and substantive law. Equity is adjectival, that is, it modifies law
rather than the other way around. Its power comes from remedies, not rights. And for
getting into equity, what is central is a grievance. To insist on an equitable cause of
action is to work a fundamental change in how a plaintiff gets into equity.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the puzzles in the contemporary law of the federal courts
is where an equitable cause of action comes from. Surely it has to come
from somewhere, for everyone recognizes the legitimacy of injunctions
like that in Ex parte Young.1 But where?
That question is not easily answered. Having a cause of action was
how a plaintiff would get into a court of law, but to get into equity, a
plaintiff needed something quite different. A suitor in equity needed
a grievance, a good story that would motivate the court. The story
needed to connect up with some recurring pattern of equitable intervention, and these patterns were called “heads of equitable
jurisdiction.”2 A plaintiff who didn’t fit within one of the heads of
equitable jurisdiction would be denied relief “for want of [e]quity”—
not for failure to state a cause of action.3
At law, the cause of action determined everything about the case,
and there was a 1:1 relationship between the cause of action and the
plaintiff’s claim. But the equitable patterns were looser. If the legal
cause of action was like a computer file organization that uses folders,
the equitable patterns worked more like tags. There might be one tag
for a suit in equity, or there might be several. What equity was offering
was not a kind of stand-alone justice, but something adjectival. It was
correcting or supplementing the justice offered by law—patching
holes, as it were. And a critical part of equity’s attraction was the
potency of its remedies.
These differences about the basis for litigation at law and in equity
have been obscured for courts and scholars today. One consequence
is that the Supreme Court has sometimes preferred to treat the
availability of equitable relief as largely a matter of statutory interpretation, as in Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc.4 Yet that
approach is not possible in cases involving non-statutory claims. Cases

1 See 209 U.S. 123 (1908). For debate about what exactly Ex parte Young stands for,
see John Harrison, Ex Parte Young, 60 STAN. L. REV. 989 (2008); James E. Pfander & Jacob
P. Wentzel, The Common Law Origins of Ex Parte Young, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1269 (2020); David
L. Shapiro, Ex Parte Young and the Uses of History, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 69 (2011).
2 See, e.g., EUGENE A. JONES, MANUAL OF EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE 31 (1916)
(“[T]he plaintiff’s narrative of his grievance . . . must state a case remediable under some
head of equity jurisdiction . . . .”).
3 See 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS, AND THE INCIDENTS
THEREOF, ACCORDING TO THE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF EQUITY OF ENGLAND AND
AMERICA § 472, at 372 (2d ed., Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1840) (1836)
(“[W]henever there is no sufficient ground shown in the Bill for the interference of a Court
of Equity, the defendant may demur to the Bill for want of Equity to sustain the
jurisdiction.”).
4 575 U.S. 320 (2015).
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like United States v. Texas5 force the courts to consider anew what it
takes for a plaintiff to get into equity.
The ambition of this Article is to recover the traditional understanding of how plaintiffs got into equity, and to show how this
understanding can help federal courts understand and inhabit equity
today. We look primarily at the concurrent jurisdiction of equity.6 In
other words, our concern is primarily with those cases in which equity
offers an alternative to what a plaintiff could get at law—especially an
alternative remedy. This concurrent jurisdiction of equity is in contrast
to the exclusive jurisdiction, i.e., the swathes of substantive law that are
entirely the creation of equity (e.g., trust law).
The federal courts have equity jurisdiction, and the Supreme
Court has decided many cases about its contours over the last quartercentury.7 In this burgeoning set of new equity cases, the Court has
looked to the traditional practices of equity to determine whether a
particular equitable claim or remedy should be available. These are
good developments.8 By recovering the traditional understanding of
the bases for equitable intervention, this Article provides a foundation
for many of these cases and for new ones in the future.
The remainder of this Article is as follows. Part I diagnoses two
reasons for the confusion about how to get into equity: one is a
misunderstanding of procedural fusion, and the other is an attempt to
read equity in terms of rights and correlative duties, much as
5 See United States v. Texas, No. 21-CV-796, 2021 WL 4593319, at *16–18 (W.D. Tex.
Oct. 6, 2021), cert. granted before judgment, 142 S. Ct. 14 (2021) (mem.), cert. dismissed as
improvidently granted, 142 S. Ct. 522 (2021) (mem.); see also Aditya Bamzai & Samuel L. Bray,
Debs and the Federal Equity Jurisdiction, 98 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2022).
6 The canonical formulation of the distinction between equity’s three jurisdictions is
in Justice Story’s Commentaries: “The jurisdiction of a Court of Equity is sometimes
concurrent with the jurisdiction of a Court of law; it is sometimes exclusive of it; and it is
sometimes auxiliary to it.” See 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE,
AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 33, at 32–33 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co.
1836); see also 1 HENRY BALLOW, A TREATISE OF EQUITY 10–11 n.f (John Fonblanque ed.,
Dublin, Byrne, J. Moore, W. Jones, E. Lynch & H. Watts 1793). On the development of the
concept, see David Yale, A Trichotomy of Equity, 6 J. LEGAL. HIST. 194 (1985). For a summary
(as well as critique), see Mike Macnair, Equity and Conscience, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
659, 665 (2007).
7 See, e.g., Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522 (2021); Liu v. SEC, 140
S. Ct. 1936 (2020); Taggart v. Lorenzen, 139 S. Ct. 1795 (2019); SCA Hygiene Prods.
Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954 (2017); Petrella v. MetroGoldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663 (2014); CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421 (2011);
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008); Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs.,
Inc., 547 U.S. 356 (2006); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006); GreatWest Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002); Grupo Mexicano de
Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999).
8 See generally Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND. L. REV.
997 (2015).
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Blackstone did with the common law. Part II considers whether equity
has “causes of action,” and concludes that it does not. Part III offers
an affirmative account of how to get into equity. It emphasizes the
centrality of the grievance, as well as equity’s loose organizing
structure, its adjectival quality, and the priority of remedies. Part IV
addresses contemporary implications.
I.

CLEARING AWAY THE COBWEBS

This Part clears away two misunderstandings that can obscure how
a plaintiff gets into equity. One is overreading the merger of legal and
equitable procedure, for which the decisive moment in the federal
courts is the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.
The other is trying to think about equity in terms of correlative rights
and duties, the deontic logic that Blackstone brought to the common
law from Roman law.
A. Procedural Fusion
How does one get into equity? The very question might strike
some as odd. Why single out equity? Why not instead simply ask how
one brings a civil action? And framed in such a quotidian way, the
question loses interest. That question is answered in elementary law
school courses on civil procedure.
Even a reader alive to the fact that procedure once differed in law
and equity might think the question a strictly historical one. Procedural fusion was a dream shared by many early American lawyers, and
it was realized long ago in New York with the enactment of the Field
Code and in most other states since. In the federal courts, it was
systematically achieved nearly a century ago with the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.9
To see that the question of how to get into equity is a live one, we
must start with clearing away a misunderstanding about the effect of
procedural fusion. In the long-running debates about procedural
fusion, the critics warned that it would lead to wider conflation and
confusion of law and equity, while the fusionists insisted that only the
procedures of law and equity were being merged.10

9 See Kellen Funk, The Union of Law and Equity: The United States, 1800–1938, in EQUITY
LAW: FUSION AND FISSION 46, 46–69 (John C.P. Goldberg, Henry E. Smith & P.G.
Turner eds., 2019).
10 See Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV.
429, 466 (2003) (“Code reformers took great pains to emphasize that the new codes
reorganized only the procedure of law and equity. Accepting Blackstone’s view that
substance and procedure were conceptually distinct, the Field Code took the additional
AND
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As a matter of legal effect, the fusionists were right. Merging the
procedures of law and equity did not affect substantive rights. Indeed,
it could not have, because the Rules Enabling Act explicitly says that
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “shall not abridge, enlarge or
modify any substantive right.”11 This understanding has been explicitly
endorsed by the Supreme Court in just the last decade. The Court
held that because laches was “a defense developed by courts of
equity[,] its principal application was, and remains, to claims of an
equitable cast.”12 And the Court expressly rejected the argument that
the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure merged legal and
equitable defenses. “True,” wrote Justice Ginsburg for the Court,
“there has been, since 1938, only ‘one form of action—the civil action.’
But ‘the substantive and remedial principles [applicable] prior to the
advent of the federal rules [have] not changed.’”13
And yet in another sense the critics of fusion were right. Equity
continues to make important contributions to our legal system, but
these have become invisible to many American lawyers, scholars, and
law students.14 There is fresh academic interest in equity and its
distinctive contributions, both actual and potential.15 But there is
plenty of inertia and unknowing indifference, and many substantive
and remedial doctrines of equity have been dislocated from equity
proper (i.e., equity as a subsidiary system of law) and have been
fragmented or dispersed throughout the common law. This is how
equity is experienced by a contemporary law student. Even when

step of recognizing the divisibility in fact of substance and procedure . . . .” (footnotes
omitted)).
11 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2018).
12 Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 678 (2014) (emphasis added).
The quoted sentence continues: “for which the Legislature has provided no fixed time
limitation.” Id.
13 Id. at 679 (citation and alterations omitted) (quoting 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1043, 177 (3d ed. 2002)); see also Stainback v. Mo
Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368, 382 n.26 (1949) (“Notwithstanding the fusion of law and
equity by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the substantive principles of Courts of Chancery
remain unaffected.”).
14 See Samuel L. Bray, Equity: Notes on the American Reception, in EQUITY AND LAW, supra
note 9, at 31, 31–45.
15 See, e.g., the contributions to this Symposium issue, as well as PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF EQUITY (Dennis Klimchuk, Irit Samet & Henry E. Smith eds.,
2020); Funk, supra note 9; Paul B. Miller, Equity as Supplemental Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF EQUITY, supra, at 92; Jennifer Nadler, What Is Distinctive About
the Law of Equity?, 41 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 854 (2021); James E. Pfander & Wade Formo,
The Past and Future of Equitable Remedies: An Essay for Frank Johnson, 71 ALA. L. REV. 723
(2020); Irit Samet, Equity, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PRIVATE LAW THEORY 373, 373–89
(Hanoch Dagan & Benjamin C. Zipursky eds., 2020); Henry E. Smith, Equity as Meta-Law,
130 YALE L.J. 1050 (2021).
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doctrines are identified as equitable, they are encountered as strewn
about courses on contract, tort, property, civil procedure, agency,
trusts, corporations, intellectual property, and constitutional law.16
Equity may have “conquered” law through procedural fusion if we
measure success by tallying the origins of elements of a now-fused
single system of civil procedure.17 Fused procedure is predominantly
equitable. But if one looks beyond procedure, equity’s triumph is less
clear. Few remember now precisely what equity contributed to fused
procedure and, more importantly, why equity’s procedures, prefusion, took the shape they did in contradistinction to those prevailing
at law.
More troubling, fusion has spilled the embankments that were
supposed to contain it. Procedural fusion has obscured distinctions
between law and equity in substantive and remedial doctrine. In other
work, one of us has examined the impact of collective amnesia about
equity on remedies while arguing that recent Supreme Court jurisprudence might stimulate renewed appreciation of the distinctive
functions performed by equitable remedies.18 In this Article, we turn
our attention to the interplay between what would now be called
substantive equity, remedial equity, and procedural equity.
B. Blackstone and Roman Law
One way in which fusion has obscured distinctions between law
and equity lies in the tendency to assimilate equitable bases for
equitable relief with legal bases for legal relief. Over the last two
centuries, especially due to the influence of Blackstone, Roman law
thinking about the structure of civil liability has shaped the common
law.19 That idea of a deontic structure has also come increasingly to
grip our thinking about equity.
The formulary writs of the old common law made the availability
of legal remedies the prisoner of procedural formality. Indeed, the
procedural formality of the writ system was so formidable that it
occluded attention to, and practical deliberation on, substantive law.
That is why historians have attributed the flowering of substantive

16 Cf. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., CASES ON EQUITABLE REMEDIES v (1938): “Equity in
American law schools seems to be suffering the fate of the Austrian Empire. One part after
another has been split off to take on an independent existence.”
17 See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 912 (1987); see also Doug
Rendleman, The Triumph of Equity Revisited: The Stages of Equitable Discretion, 15 NEV. L.J.
1397, 1398 (2015).
18 See Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 530 (2016).
19 See Michael Lobban, Blackstone and the Science of Law, 30 HIST. J. 311, 312 (1987).
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doctrine at common law—in torts, contracts, and beyond—to the
abolition of the writ system.
But before the writ system was abolished, Blackstone and other
synthesizers wanted to bring some order to the burgeoning common
law. It was not surprising that they would turn to Roman law, and
especially to Justinian’s Digests, to do so. Inspired by Roman law,
Blackstone argued that the common law consistently manifests a
deontic logic whereby the wrongful violation of duties correlative to
primary rights (as a matter of substantive doctrine) generates
secondary rights or claims to remedies (via remedial doctrine).
Blackstone was, tellingly, not interested in equity. He was a
famous equity skeptic, considering it an aberration generated by the
writ system—perhaps practically necessary, but unfortunate and
historically contingent.20 But Blackstone’s scheme has taken hold of
jurisprudential thought on equity nearly as much it has shaped
common-law theory. Many working within common-law traditions
have insisted on fitting all of common law that can be considered
private law—procedural, substantive, and remedial—into deontic categories of correlative right and duty, wrong and remedy. Wesley
Hohfeld, an object of resurgent fascination, influentially rendered the
normative grammar of the common law in terms of “Fundamental
Jural Relations,” building on Blackstone’s scheme.21
Lawyers with fading fluency in equity have come to think about,
to analyze, and to represent or reformulate it in Blackstonian and
Hohfeldian terms. Witness references—now standard in professional
usage—to “equitable rights,” “equitable obligations,” “equitable
wrongs,” “equitable ownership,” “equitable title,” and the like. In
each case, legal concepts are invoked in the representation and
development of equitable concepts. In each case, the new equitable
concepts are drawn into a normative vocabulary and set of associated
practices appropriate to law and its relative formality (rendered,
usually, in deontic terms).
The bases of civil suits lie at the interstices of substance and
procedure. These bases of civil suits also inform claims for remedies
and guide judicial discretion in crafting remedial orders. Thus, some

20 See John H. Langbein, Introduction to 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES viii
(Univ. of Chi. Press 1979) (1768) (“[Blackstone] insisted that there were no material
differences between the substantive law of the courts of law and equity, and he concealed
or downplayed the facts that made this contention untenable.”); see also Main, supra note
10, at 453 (“Blackstone largely ignored equity, finding the law/equity distinction to be
superficial” (footnotes omitted) (citing Robert L. Munger, A Glance at Equity, 25 YALE L.J.
42, 49 (1915))).
21 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 710 (1917).
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of our most consequential linguistic practices as lawyers involve the
choice of words in stating—and then arguing about, and reasoning in
relation to—the bases of suits. What should we call recognized bases
of civil suits? At law, it seems natural and has long been customary to
call them causes of action. But is “cause of action” an apt term in
equity?
II.

ARE THERE EQUITABLE CAUSES OF ACTION?

This Part considers two closely related meanings of “cause of
action,” namely, the form of action indicated in the plaintiff’s pleading
and the plaintiff’s legal entitlement to sue. It shows that equity, strictly
speaking, does not have a cause of action in either sense.
A. Two Senses of a Cause of Action
The phrase “cause of action” means a number of different
things.22 Two meanings need to be pulled apart before we can decide
whether it is intelligible to speak of an “equitable cause of action.”
The first sense of “cause of action” is derived from the old
common-law writs. The writs were the structuring devices for the
common-law system of adjudication. Plaintiffs would sue under various
writs, and each one was a different “form of action.”23 The forms
varied. Each had different requirements. But those requirements
were absolutely central: meeting them was necessary and sufficient for
a plaintiff to succeed.
In time, especially with nineteenth-century pleading reforms in
the United States and the demise of some of the older forms, the
phrase “form of action” passed out of use and was replaced by “cause
of action.” But the salient features were the same. The causes of action
were the legal categories into which suits fell. If you were a plaintiff, it
was critical to know which category you were in, because that would
determine what the elements of your claim were.24
This first sense of “cause of action” is focused on pleading. To
have a cause of action means to be able to plead (or successfully plead)
the various elements required. In the twentieth century, “cause of
22 For a leading analysis of “cause of action,” see Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Article III and
the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REV. 777 (2004), though note that Professor Bellia uses “cause
of action” for both law and equity.
23 See, e.g., SIR JOHN BAKER, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 60–76 (5th
ed. 2019); F.W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW: A COURSE OF
LECTURES (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1909).
24 Cf. Charles E. Clark, The Code Cause of Action, 33 YALE L.J. 817, 837 (1924) (“The
cause of action under the code should be viewed as an aggregate of operative facts which
give rise to one or more relations of right-duty between two or more persons.”).
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action” fell out of favor and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure used
“claim” instead. This term was broader—multiple rights could be subsumed within a single claim. The terminological shift also suggested a
shift away from legal theories (elements of a cause of action) and
toward facts, or toward a transaction, as the basic principle for
organizing what a plaintiff says to justify her being in court. So the
pleading sense of “cause of action” is now obsolete, at least outside of
code-pleading states. But it has nevertheless been generative.
A second sense of “cause of action” is a legal entitlement to sue.
This is distinct from the first sense, because here attention is trained
not on what the plaintiff says to the court (the pleading sense) but on
whether there is some legal authority (e.g., a statute or constitutional
provision) that allows the plaintiff to come into court in the first place.
This second sense is about authorization. It is related to and
probably developed out of the first sense. At common law, there was
no prior set of legal rights for which you might be able to pursue legal
redress: the forms of action were the means of legal redress, and from
the operation of these forms of action it could then be deduced that
there was an underlying right. That is why the substantive law was
created in the interstices of procedure.25
Once these two senses of “cause of action” are distinguished, it is
also important to see how they changed over time. In the nineteenth
century, for legal claims, the dominant sense of “cause of action” was
the first sense, about pleading. In the world still shaped by the forms
of action, the requirement of a cause of action in the first sense did
much of the work we now attribute to standing doctrine.26 A federal
court would not need to inquire whether there was a concrete injury,
traceable to the defendant, that would be redressable by a favorable
ruling. The form of action, the cause of action, would determine what
counted as an injury, and who could be sued, and what the favorable
ruling would be.
Not only was standing doctrine underdeveloped (by our standards) during the time of the “cause of action” in the first sense, but
there was also little anxiety over whether there was a “cause of action”
in the second sense, about a legal entitlement to sue. If the plaintiff
had a form of action, a cause of action, then that was the legal
entitlement—there was no need for a legislature to authorize the suit.

25 HENRY SUMNER MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 389 (1883); see
also Bellia, supra note 22, at 631–632.
26 See Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and
Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 170 (1992) (including the plaintiff’s cause of action among
the “important antecedents” of modern standing doctrine); see also Bellia, supra note 22, at
826.
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It was “good at common law.” Once statutes became more common,
they would add or create causes of action.
But then two things changed. One can be located in a specific
year: in 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure put the federal
courts on a trajectory away from using “cause of action” in the first
sense. Out with cause of action, for pleading purposes, and in with the
claim.27
The other is a more diffuse development throughout the latenineteenth and twentieth centuries, and that is the rising tide of
positivism.28 Once there was widespread distrust for the common law
as a source of claims in federal court, once there was a need to trace
each claim to some authorizing positive enactment, then a “cause of
action” in the second sense became salient and critical.
These twin developments mean that “cause of action” in the first,
pleading sense was fading away; while “cause of action” in the second,
legal entitlement sense was on the rise. To sum up: “cause of action”
can be used in two senses (pleading, legal entitlement to sue), and by
the late twentieth century the dominant sense was the second. Today
that remains the case.
B. Is There a Cause of Action in Equity?
Now can we speak of an “equitable cause of action” in either of
these senses? In the first, pleading sense, there never was such a thing
as an equitable cause of action. There were no forms of action in
equity. There were no elements that, if proved, were necessary and
sufficient to secure relief. As discussed below, equity has a different
structure, one that emphasizes grievances (rather than wrongs) and
narratives (rather than elements). There is an emphasis on the chancellor’s discretion, and the need for the plaintiff to motivate the
chancellor to act.

27 See 1 JAMES WM. MOORE & JOSEPH FRIEDMAN, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE: A
TREATISE ON THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1938) 145 (“Nowhere in the Rules
is the term ‘cause of action’ used. This can only mean that the draftsmen, by the use of the
phrases ‘claim’ or ‘claim for relief,’ hoped that such different expressions in lieu of
‘cause of action’ would give the courts freedom to escape from the morass of decisions
concerning a cause of action; and would adopt a pragmatic treatment of what we may for
convenience still refer to as a cause of action.” (footnote omitted)); see also Subrin, supra
note 17, at 976 (describing Charles Clark’s efforts to avoid requiring either facts or causes
of action).
28 Erie is often taken as emblematic, though this association has been criticized. See
Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal Positivism, 84 VA. L. REV. 673
(1998).
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It is true that equity would delineate the requirements for a suit
with more specificity in the areas in its exclusive jurisdiction.29 For
example, a breach of trust claim, or a breach of confidence claim, have
long had definite requirements, and these might look very much like
elements. There might be relatively little judicial discretion once the
claim was made out. Even so, the hallmarks of how one gets into
equity—including the emphasis on grievances and narratives—are also
found in the exclusive jurisdiction. And recall that the concern of this
Article is with the concurrent jurisdiction, the cases where equity
intervenes to alter the legal outcome or provide remedial reinforcements. In the concurrent jurisdiction, equity manifestly never had
anything like a cause of action in the pleading sense.
In the second, legal entitlement sense, was there a cause of action
in equity? Yes, if a legal entitlement to sue is being contrasted with
lawless vigilantism or officious intermeddling. Suing in equity was licit,
permitted by the legal system as a whole. But if we are asking whether
there was an enactment that authorized this plaintiff to bring this suit,
the answer is not necessarily. Equity is not a creature of statute, and
the different kinds of claims it would hear were not and are not sharply
distinguished from each other (as the forms of action were). And
these claims are usually not traceable to other authority. They developed out of the decisions of the chancellors, especially in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as equity developed a stronger
sense of precedent.30
Three refinements should be noted. First, in the United States,
equity was included in the federal judicial power under Article III of
the U.S. Constitution and was authorized by the Judiciary Act of 1789.31
Even so, these authorities cross-reference the concept of equity
developed in England.32 They refer to the whole system of “equity
jurisprudence.” They do not identify and provide a basis in positive
law for specific equitable causes of action.33

29 On the jurisdictions of equity, see supra note 6.
30 See BAKER, supra note 23, at 118–119; see also sources cited in Bray, supra note 8, at
1012 n.72.
31 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78; see Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo,
S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318 (1999).
32 See Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105 (1945) (“The suits in equity of which the
federal courts have had ‘cognizance’ ever since 1789 constituted the body of law which had
been transplanted to this country from the English Court of Chancery.”).
33 Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate
Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 949 (2011) (“After Congress
created federal question jurisdiction in 1875, federal courts began entertaining bills of
equity that sought to enjoin allegedly unlawful administrative action. They did so on the
theory that federal courts needed only a grant of jurisdiction, not a statutory cause of action,

1774

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:5

Second, in the Process Act of 1792,34 Congress prescribed the use
by the federal courts of “the principles, rules and usages which belong
to courts of equity . . . , as contradistinguished from courts of common
law.”35 Moreover, the same statute authorized the Supreme Court to
make procedural rules for federal cases in equity.36 Yet neither
provision generated any identifiable equitable causes of action. Like
the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Process Act of 1792 cross-referenced the
English practice.37 And the Federal Rules of Equity promulgated in
1822 would incorporate the “bill” from traditional equity38 but say
nothing about causes of action, which meant that the practice of the
English Chancery Court remained authoritative in federal courts.39
Third, over time, there were federal statutes that authorized
plaintiffs to obtain various kinds of equitable relief, especially
injunctions, in certain circumstances. Some of those statutes might
have been merely codifying the decisions of equity, but where they
added to equity’s armory or scope of operation, they could be thought
of as giving a “cause of action” in the second, legal entitlement sense.
Even so, it was unnecessary for equity to have a “cause of action” in the
sense of a legal entitlement to sue. A plaintiff might have a statutorily
specified right to sue in equity, but no one would ever have thought
that she had to have a statutorily specified right. Equity was in the
background, and it was always there.40
Although equity lacked a “cause of action” in either sense, courts
of equity still had reasons to act. It is only in a loose, non-technical
sense that we could speak of a court of equity having a cause of
action—something more like “a cause for acting.”41 Indeed, much of
in order to exercise the powers of a court of equity in ruling on a request to enjoin agency
action.”).
34 Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 275 (repealed 1872).
35 Id. § 2, at 276.
36 Id. On the Process Act of 1792 and federal equity, see 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR.,
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS
TO 1801, at 580–586 (1971); see also Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Original
Source of the Cause of Action in Federal Courts: The Example of the Alien Tort Statute, 101 VA. L.
REV. 609, 653 (2015).
37 See Vattier v. Hinde, 32 U.S. (5 Pet.) 252, 274 (1833)
38 20 (7 Wheat.) U.S. vi (1822) (Rules 4–5).
39 See id. at xiii (Rule 33).
40 Cf. Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1813, 1829–31
(2012).
41 See, e.g., JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE NEW FEDERAL EQUITY RULES 180–81 (Byron F.
Babbitt ed., 8th rev. ed. 1933) (1912) (using the phrase “stating the cause of action” in
connection with a plaintiff’s bill of complaint under Rule 25 of the Federal Equity Rules of
1912); Clark, supra note 24, at 825 (distinguishing common-law pleading from equity,
because in the latter “different rules prevailed,” for “the plaintiff’s bill was in the form of
one continuous narrative, and ‘the bundle of diverse rights which equity permitted a
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the law of equity was a loose description of situations in which equity
would act. This traveled under the name of “equitable jurisdiction.”
That term is misleading to many readers now because it did not refer
to the power of a court of equity to pronounce a judgment. Rather, it
was a shorthand for the whole “body of equitable precedents,
practices, and attitudes.”42 In other words, equitable jurisdiction can
be understood as the sum total of the things that equity was “in the
habit of undertaking.”43
And so, to get into the equitable jurisdiction, you needed to have
a good story, a real grievance, and a persuasive account of how you
wanted equity to do something that was the sort of thing that equity
does. This grievance, not a cause of action in either of the two senses
described above, was what would motivate the chancellor in the
concurrent jurisdiction of equity.44
But many courts and scholars have given up on being careful to
avoid speaking of a “cause of action” in equity, and the new but
widespread use of “cause of action” in equity is misleading. It imports
plaintiff to enforce in one suit might be regarded as one equitable cause of action’”); cf. 6
SIR JOHN BAKER, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 1483–1558, 174 (2003)
(“Since the theoretical basis of its jurisdiction was that a party sometimes required a remedy
in conscience where none was available at common law, it was requisite that a plaintiff show
not only a cause of action in conscience but also the absence of a remedy at law.” (emphasis
added)). An example of this loose usage is Justice Douglas’s insistence in American
Federation of Labor v. Watson that a district court “should not invoke its powers unless those
who seek its aid have a cause of action in equity,” which he seemingly equated with the
requirement that a court of equity should not act except “to prevent irreparable injury
which is clear and imminent.” 327 U.S. 582, 593 (1946) (first citing Douglas v. City of
Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 162–63 (1943); and then quoting id. at 163).
42 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES—EQUITY—RESTITUTION 180 (2d ed.
1993).
43 Jones v. Parker, 163 Mass. 564, 566 (1895) (Holmes, J.). For transitional cases, see
Mass. State Grange v. Benton, 272 U.S. 525, 528 (1926) (Holmes, J.) (“Courts sometimes
say that there is no jurisdiction in equity when they mean only that equity ought not to give
the relief asked.”); Smith v. Apple, 264 U.S. 274, 278–80 (1924). By 1939, the Supreme
Court could say of the Judiciary Act of 1789’s reference to suits in equity that “[t]his clause
of the statute does not define the jurisdiction of the district courts as federal courts, in the
sense of their power or authority to hear and decide, but prescribes the body of doctrine
which is to guide their decisions and enable them to determine whether in any given
instance a suit of which a district court has jurisdiction as a federal court is an appropriate
one for the exercise of the extraordinary powers of a court of equity.” Atlas Life Ins. Co. v.
W.I. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568 (1939); see also Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336
U.S. 368, 381–82 (1949) (“As the District Court found irreparable injury to all respondents
in the jurisdictional amount, we assume there is both federal and equitable jurisdiction.”).
44 Note that what we describe as a “grievance” is similar to what Henry Smith describes
as a “trigger.” See Smith, supra note 15, at 1059, 1081, 1084–1089, 1112. Grievance emphasizes the position of the suitor in equity, and it has a moral and affective quality. Trigger
emphasizes law and equity as structures. But both words are descriptions of the movement
from outside of equity to being inside equity.
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a definiteness and decisiveness. It conveys a sense of regularity and
formality that comes from the formal juridical definition of the bases
of civil suits, along with a sense that these bases are recognized as such
at law. That is, “causes of action” are recognized as independently
actionable grounds for litigation, a hearing and, if the grounds are
deemed well established (factually) and proven (legally) through
impartial adjudication, for relief. “Cause of action” works well as a
synonym for bases of civil suits that sound in the common law precisely
because the language echoes the conceptual definiteness and
peremptory normative status of legal rules establishing primary rights;
rights violations (civil wrongs) are generic causes of action.
Just as the deontic language and logic characteristic of substantive
doctrine at common law have come to dominate analysis of substantive
doctrine in equity, so too has reference to equitable “causes of action”
come to overtake language native to equity—that is, as discussed more
fully below, the language of “petition,” “complaint,” and “suits in
equity.”
Were that the choice of language was innocent. Among lawyers,
it rarely is. It is a mistake, or at least conducive of a mistake, to refer to
“causes of action” in equity. To do so is to assimilate complaints
brought in equity—which require petitioners to show that an equity
has arisen in their favor, relative to and notwithstanding the law—with
actions brought at law, which require plaintiffs to allege a civil wrong
or other actual or threatened violation of norms or enabling doctrines
of general application.
In the following Part we lay out an alternative: an affirmative
account of how one gets into equity. In doing so, we reveal the
mischief, both conceptual and normative, that is produced by
imposing the legal concept of “cause of action” in equity (especially in
the second sense of a legal entitlement to sue). We also uncover key
differences between suits in equity and actions at law. These differences are now largely obscured because of fusion. Even though fusion
is notionally just procedural, here, at the interstices of procedure and
substance, it has caused great confusion.
III.

HOW TO GET INTO EQUITY

This Part gives an affirmative account of how a plaintiff gets into
equity. It begins by carefully distinguishing a plaintiff’s grievance from
the violation of a fixed duty correlative to a plaintiff’s right, and it
shows that the grievance is central in equity. The equitable structure
is looser, and it is always stated in relation to law, rather than the other
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way around. In other words, equity is adjectival law or meta-law.45 And
in equity it is remedies that are the focus of complexity and the object
of judicial attention.
A. The Centrality of Grievances
At the heart of the common law is the concept of the civil wrong.
This concept is traceable to the formulary writs, and to the Roman-law
influenced reconstruction of the common law by Blackstone. But the
substantive basis of a typical suit in equity was, and is, something more
amorphous. It is a grievance.
A grievance, in the sense used in this Article, is a complaint rooted
in interpersonal interactions that are governed by law, and it is a
challenge to the law’s routine administration or enforcement. Over
time, with doctrinal development, some of these grievances have
become standardized so as to be roughly equivalent to civil wrongs.
For example, equity did recognize certain wrongs in relation to the
exercise of legal rights and powers, such as a breach of fiduciary duty.
Here, as is characteristic of doctrine in the exclusive jurisdiction,
equity supplemented surrounding law with new law; the product of this
function can be described as “supplemental equity.” But most of the
grievances that equity would hear have not been formalized as civil
wrongs. Here, exercising its older function, equity channels discretionary corrective intervention in the enforcement of law. A suit in
“corrective equity” is paradigmatically about a grievance, not about a
liability for a wrong.
Consistent with corrective equity’s exceptional nature and the
underlying frailties of law that equity seeks to ameliorate, it is not
surprising that the substantive bases of suits in corrective equity are less
defined than those at common law.46 Grievances recognized in corrective equity implicate hardships that are difficult to foresee or define,
or that may be foreseeable but nevertheless do not have a set of
common factual elements. They can involve a wide range of inequities
and injustices—in contrast to the sharply defined and independently
actionable causes of action at common law. Indeed, it was precisely
because these hardships, inequities, and injustices were not actionable
that the grievances that lie in corrective equity had to be brought in
equity. And, as we will explain below,47 these grievances were not
actionable “independently” because they were held in relation to law
(e.g., in relation to its abuse or its gaps).

45
46
47

See generally Smith, supra note 15.
See id.
See infra Section III.C.
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Maitland rightly said that we can have law without equity, but that
the converse is not true; equity without law is but a “castle in the air.”48
The same is true by implication of equitable grievances. They are
grievances not merely in relation to the conduct of a person under law;
they are grievances in relation to law as such, implicating as they do
assertions that a law, though just as a general matter, generates or
permits injustice in the circumstances that are the basis for the
grievance. The petitioner asks that his or her grievance be heard as a
matter of natural justice and equity notwithstanding the law and its
general justice (i.e., the law’s practical reasonableness or moral
soundness as applied in typical circumstances). As Adam Smith put it,
in his lectures on jurisprudence, “when one wants to have his cause
tried by the Court of Chancery, he relates his story to the court,
representing at the same time that the courts of common law can grant
him no redress.”49
The inherently irregular nature of the grievances that ground
corrective equitable intervention is evident from a brief survey of
substantive doctrine. Consider, for example, grievances alleging
undue influence in contracting, oppression in corporate decisionmaking, or estoppel in the assertion of property rights. In each case,
the grievance, while amenable of broad description and illustration, is
not amenable of exhaustive definition. When petitioners articulate
their grievances, they are not simply aiming to show satisfaction of
conditions requisite to liability. Instead, they aim to show that the
subject matter of a complaint (a) falls within the wide parameters of a
kind of grievance that equity has recognized or has jurisdiction to
recognize and (b) is sufficiently compelling in its particulars as to
justify intervention that is exceptional and hence inherently
discretionary.
So, for example, in petitioning for relief from a forced sale of
shares on the basis of oppression, an aggrieved minority shareholder
does not plead facts suggestive of satisfaction of individuated elements
of “liability” for a “wrong” of oppression. Rather, the grievance recites
facts showing, particularly and with sensitivity to context, the unfairly
disappointed expectations of the minority shareholder at the behest of
a majority shareholder who, in coercing a sale, acted lawfully but
sharply or opportunistically.
As this example illustrates, equity’s recognized grievances can be
denominated. They are not free-form adventures in remedial flexibility. Yet they have a loose structure because the grievances recognized
48 F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY: A COURSE OF LECTURES 19 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker
eds., 2d rev. ed. 1936).
49 ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 281 (R.L. Meek, D.D. Raphael & P.G.
Stein eds., Oxford 1978) (1763).
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by equity are so many glosses on potentially inequitable behavior. They
are wide, open-textured recharacterizations of the kinds of
circumstance in which equity might alter—because it has altered—the
operation of law (e.g., by reversing corporate decisions reached in
conformity with proper procedure, invalidating a technically valid
contract, or refusing to permit disclaiming of representations that are,
as a matter of law, non-binding).
There are some exceptions. These tend to appear in equity’s
exclusive jurisdiction, when equity is operating in a supplemental
mode.50 In areas such as the law of trusts, partnerships, corporations,
and mortgages, equitable intervention was once exceptional. But over
time it was made first-order law, with courts of equity devising
generalized norms that have the imperative quality of correlative rights
and duties, and that imply liability that is functionally equivalent to
wrong-based liability at common law (being premised on violation of
equitable obligations).51 As noted earlier, in these areas, a petition in
equity does look more like the itemized statement of a cause of action
at law: there are generalized norms that include duties, violation of
those duties will result in liability, and such violation is independently
actionable. Equity will impose liability for a violation of one of those
duties.
And yet even these exceptions prove the rule, and they show how
equity resists full assimilation to Romanistic reconstruction of the
common law. Even where equity supplements law, and it does so by
elaborating precisified standards of conduct and denoting them
“duties,” it does not go all the way in mimicking the deontic structure
of liability native to civil law. It is, for instance, common to refer to
“fiduciary duties,” “duties of confidence,” “duties of good faith,” and
the like, but it is much less common—indeed, rare—to refer to
corresponding underlying primary rights.52 Equitable duties mark
(now) fixed constraints on independently grounded, properly legal,
rights and powers.
In other words, these equitable duties condition the exercise of
legal, not equitable, rights and powers, and though the existence of a
50 See Miller, supra note 15.
51 Marcia Neave & Mark Weinberg, The Nature and Function of Equities (Part I), 6 U.
TAS. L. REV. 24, 26 (1978) (noting that in respect to these doctrines, “there is no doubt
about the plaintiff’s entitlement to a remedy . . . . It can [for example] be dogmatically
stated that where B fraudulently induces A to convey land to B, A is entitled to have the
conveyance set aside against B.”).
52 Cf. Charles D. Frierson, A Certain Fundamental Difference in Viewpoint Between Law
and Equity as Illustrated by Two Maxims, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL
SESSION OF THE BAR ASSOCIATION OF ARKANSAS HELD AT FORT SMITH, ARKANSAS, JUNE 1 AND
2, 1915 130, 135 (Bar Ass’n of Ark. 1915) (“[M]ark you, the king was never appealed to
merely for the establishment of a right; but only for the redress of some wrong or injury.”).
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duty implies a corresponding entitlement, equity has tended to ignore
that element precisely because the entitlement is legal and so primarily
the business of law. Corrective equity, by contrast, is concerned with
remedying inequity in the exercise of legal rights or powers. Equity’s
grievances stand apart from the deontic structure of liability at law
precisely because they are triggers for modifications or departures
from the outcomes otherwise dictated by that structure.
And the primary and primordial function of equity—reflected in
a surfeit of substantive equitable doctrine—is, again, corrective rather
than supplemental in nature. Equity corrects for exceptional injustice
or inequity, the risk of which inheres in law in virtue of its generality.53
As Henry Smith has explained, through substantive doctrines that
engage and channel its corrective function, equity ameliorates the
damaging effects of opportunism on the integrity of first-order law,
responding to exceptional instances of abuse or misuse of legal rights
and powers.54 Additionally, corrective equity adjusts the operation of
law in response to polycentric problems and other circumstances of
unusual complexity in the reconciliation of different legal norms and
enabling doctrines—circumstances that are, by their nature, difficult
to foresee and address through further development of law.55
Thus, when equity acts in a supplemental mode it goes furthest
toward establishing equitable duties, violation of which may be
pleaded in a manner similar to the pleading of a cause of action. Yet
this is not the paradigmatic mode in which equity operates.
B. Tags, Not Hierarchies
The central “trigger” for equitable intervention is a grievance, as
described in the preceding Section. But equity does not, before every
suit, drink from the River Lethe and forget all its past work. How have
the individual grievances to which equity responds become organized?
In other words, how have the grievances clustered, forming patterns of
equitable intervention that have some predictability?
Here an analogy is useful. In computer file systems, the typical
organization is hierarchical. A folder contains other folders, which in
turn contain other folders, which contain documents and still more
folders. And so on. Each file or folder is located within one folder, no
more, no less. That hierarchical organization resembles a Linnaean

53 See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, at 1137b (c. 4th century B.C.E.), in 2
THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE at 1795–96 (J.O. Urmson rev., Jonathan Barnes ed.,
W.D. Ross transl., 1984); see also Dennis Klimchuk, Aristotle at the Foundations of the Law of
Equity, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF EQUITY 32, supra note 15.
54 See Smith, supra note 15, at 1054–56.
55 See id.
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classification, with each species within one genus, and each genus
within one family.
An alternative organization uses tags. All the files may be in a
single bucket, but they are marked with various tags. For example, a
photo app might allow users to tag their photos “Home,” “Kids,”
“Puppy,” “Vacation,” etc. Multiple tags can be applied to the same
photo. One photo could be marked “Home,” another “Home” and
“Kids,” another “Kids” and “Puppy” and “Vacation.” In a tag system,
the hierarchy is flat and the tags are multiple.
The common-law system of causes of action resembles a
hierarchical file organization. Each cause of action is different from
another. The same event might give rise to several possible causes of
action—say, both a tort of defamation and a breach of contract. But
the tort of defamation is separate and distinct from the breach of
contract; each has separate elements, and each is in a separate “folder”
(tort or contract).
The grievances that give rise to equitable intervention are also
organized, but their organization is based on tags. For example, one
of the chief bases of equitable intervention is “no adequate remedy at
law.” Another is “multiplicity of suits.” A court might give an equitable
remedy because there is no adequate remedy at law, or because doing
so will avoid a multiplicity of suits, or for both reasons.56
Contrast a suit bringing two tort claims against a defendant, such
as the torts of assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The court will analyze the elements of one, and then analyze the
elements of the other. If the plaintiff is successful at proving both torts,
there will be a quantum of damages for assault, and a separate
quantum of damages for the emotional infliction of intentional
distress.
Corrective equity does not work this way. A court might decide
that the lack of an adequate remedy at law is a good basis for granting
an injunction, and that an injunction is needed to avoid multiplicity of
suits. But the court will not then proceed to analyze a “no adequate
56 There is no canonical list of these tags or their relationship. For example, the more
general entries in John Freeman-Mitford’s late-eighteenth-century list were summarized in
Patrick Devlin, Equity, Due Process and the Seventh Amendment: A Commentary on the Zenith
Case, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1571, 1586–93 (1983): “Equity intervenes in the first place where the
common law gives a right but fails to afford a complete remedy; in the second place, ‘where
the courts of ordinary jurisdiction,’ i.e., the courts of common law, ‘are made instruments
of injustice’; and in the third place, where the common law gives no right, but where upon
the principles of universal justice the interference of the judicial power is necessary to
prevent a wrong.” Id. at 1586 (quoting JOHN MITFORD, A TREATISE ON THE PLEADINGS IN
SUITS IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY, BY ENGLISH BILL 103 (2d ed. Dublin, Elizabeth Lynch
1789) (1780)); cf. STORY, supra note 3, § 32, at 30–31 (endorsing Mitford’s list as a summary
of the “general account” of equitable jurisdiction).
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remedy at law” claim as distinct from a “multiplicity of suits” claim.
There won’t be one injunction meant to remedy the lack of an
adequate remedy at law, while another injunction is meant to remedy
the multiplicity-of-suits problem. In other words, these two bases for
equitable intervention are means of establishing that a plaintiff can get
into equity, but that is all. They are not separable claims that retain a
distinct identity throughout the litigation process.
C. The Adjectival Nature of Equity
Another concern with the assimilation of equitable and legal bases
of civil actions under the legal nomenclature of “cause of action” is
that it conceals the fundamentally adjectival nature of all forms of
equitable intervention, and thus all substantive bases of suits in equity.
Equity is adjectival in relation to law in that its interventions
modify the law (e.g., by supplementing it) or its enforcement (e.g., by
correcting it). Thus, equitable suits are suits brought in relation to law
and, where the basis of a suit is a grievance in corrective equity, it must
meet the burden of displacing the default presupposition that relief
must be sought in law. That is, in order to successfully petition for
correctively equitable intervention, a petitioner must show that there
is no adequate remedy at law.
This adjectival quality is missed by those who treat “cause of
action” or “right of action” as a good description of how one gets into
equity. That approach assumes a procedural equivalence in the
substantive bases of civil litigation in law and in equity. Accepting that
equivalence would confuse the relationship between law and equity,
or, more accurately, equity’s bearing toward law. That is a problem
because equity’s distinctively adjectival orientation toward law suffuses
it, marking the procedural, substantive, and remedial doctrines that
are arrayed across its different “jurisdictions.”57 The legal nomenclature suggests that all claimants assert well-defined private rights (or
claim similarly well-defined powers or permissions, or invoke a legal
form of relationship or association). And it suggests that when those
claimants initiate a civil action, and state their case, the question is just
whether they reach into a bag of recognized “causes of action”
supplied by law or a similar bag supplied by equity.
In other work, one of us has explained that common-law private
law (including property, torts, and contracts) articulates primary rights;
that is, norms that guide the actions of members of political
communities as to the ways in which they may or must interact in
recognition of their moral interests in their person, property, agree-

57

On the different jurisdictions of equity, see supra note 6.
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ments, and other undertakings.58 Understood in this sense (i.e., in a
way amenable to Romanistic/Blackstonian analysis), common-law
private law is meant to supply a comprehensive compendium of rules
that lend order to civil society.59
If the guidance supplied by way of primary rights is to be effective,
it will be practically reasonable.60 It must also be general (i.e.,
applicable to all members of a community, or those similarly situated
in ways relevant to the law’s legitimate aims). That is why scholars so
often place emphasis in private law on formality (i.e., relative
invariance to context).61
Most of the history of equity can be summarized as an entire
subsidiary system of justice developing—and increasing in consistency
and systematicity—out of what were initially informal and inscrutable
practices of entertaining petitions, put in simple and piteous terms, by
those seeking justice unavailable at law.62 Equity emerged and developed as a system as the Chancery’s institutional apparatus expanded,
58 See Paul B. Miller, Juridical Justification of Private Rights, in JUSTIFYING PRIVATE
RIGHTS 105, 109 (Simone Degeling, Michael Crawford & Nicholas Tiverios eds., 2020).
59 See Paul B. Miller, The New Formalism in Private Law, 66 AM. J. JURIS. 175 (2021).
60 See id. at 199–200. The practical reasonableness of a law is a function of the moral
quality of the guidance it applies, understood relative to its content and actual (vs.
intended) impact on the practical deliberation and conduct of its addressees. Id. In turn,
the justice of a person’s actions by light of practically reasonable laws is a matter of the
person’s willing conformity to the law’s requirements, while the justice of official
enforcement action (including court judgments) is a matter of its vindication of the law
and the guidance it provides. When a claimant at law seeks official vindication of a primary
right originating in law—whether by way of declaratory, injunctive, or remedial orders—
they are seeking justice according to law and, given that the relief sought is grounded in
enjoyment of a right, they are properly understood to be exercising a power to seek
recourse in asserting a “cause of action.” Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective
Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695 (2003). The law establishes causes of action (e.g., by specifying
requisites of wrongful violation of a given right), and the justice of the claimant’s cause
limits the court’s legitimate assertion of authority in determining whether and how to hear
and to dispose of the action brought. Understood functionally, a claimant who asserts a
cause of action is calling into operation the first-order system of action-guiding norms
supplied by law in response to a defendant’s alleged failure to conform with it. See Smith,
supra note 15, at 1079–80. Or, put another way, the claimant seeks recourse for the
defendant’s failure to abide by peremptory general guidance supplied by law (i.e., guidance
the defendant was unconditionally obligated to abide by).
61 See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Systems Theory: Emergent Private Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE NEW PRIVATE LAW 143 (Andrew S. Gold, John C.P. Goldberg, Daniel B.
Kelly, Emily Sherwin & Henry E. Smith eds., 2020); Henry E. Smith, The Persistence of System
in Property Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 2055 (2015); Jeremy Waldron, “Transcendental Nonsense”
and System in the Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 16 (2000).
62 See George Burton Adams, The Origin of English Equity, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 87, 91
(1916) (“[T]he essential characteristic of Equity procedure . . . is that it begins with a
petition asking the king to interfere to secure justice where it would not be secured by the
ordinary and existing processes of law.”); see generally BAKER, supra note 23, at 106–24.
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its procedures regularized, and its substantive and remedial doctrines
were developed. This development happened through ordinary
analogical reasoning. As they decided whether or not to give relief,
the chancellors reached for definition of equity’s adjectival jurisdiction
(notably, via formulation of maxims), and they identified patterns of a
sort essential to the development of recognizably legal constructs (e.g.,
equitable principles and standards that specify not rights but rather
the manner of their exercise).
But, as noted earlier, in order to preserve its functionality,
corrective equity was never fully formalized; i.e., it was never reduced
to norms and enabling doctrines meant to provide ex ante guidance to
all members of a given political community. Rather, as Henry Smith
has explained, corrective equity operates primarily ex post.63 It operates
relative to the immediate past or potential invocation of law in a
particular case. Its doctrines direct judges toward the kinds of
particular injustice or inequity that might, depending on facts pled,
warrant relief in equity from the routine administration of law.
Corrective equity consists in interventions made against, and so
adjectivally in relation to, law. Where granted, equitable relief suspends or otherwise varies the enforcement of legal rights, conditions
the exercise of legal powers, requires the specific performance of legal
obligations, or otherwise modifies the usual effect of law. The fact that
intervention, premised on the successful presentation of a grievance,
is exceptional and focused on the achievement of particular justice is
reflected in the maxim that equity acts in personam and not in rem.64
The maxim is something of a misfit for supplemental equity, insofar as
its doctrines operate generally and prospectively. But it continues to
resonate in corrective equity, for here equity aims not to make or to
change law but rather to allow for adjustment of its administration in
a manner that is intelligible as a matter of moral principle, even as its
work is neither the product of, nor productive of, a legal rule.
One might think that where equity supplements rather than
corrects law, it loses its adjectival orientation. And, as noted earlier, if
we think of the adjectival bearing of equity simply in terms of
discretionary adjustment of law in its administration, it is true to say
that supplemental equity becomes law in achieving full integration with
surrounding law. But all supplemental equity originated in corrective
equity. As a result, even supplemental equity bears residual markings
of equity’s adjectival orientation toward law.
Supplemental equity consists in adjectival modifications made
durable when time and experience generated awareness in Chancery

63
64

See Smith, supra note 15, at 1076–81.
See id. at 1116–18.
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of patterns of opportunism or other sources of mischief that—being
patterned—invited supplemental lawmaking. As trusts scholars have
said of the beneficial interest of the cestui que trust, equity came to
recognize in personam equitable claims in the cestui held against (by
way of duties recognized in equity) the in rem legal rights of the trustee
over the trust corpus. The cestui’s beneficial interest became cognizable as such—i.e., as a generic equitable interest—but only gradually,
emerging out of a mass of cases in which grievances were asserted by
cestuis que use and, before that, by persons betrayed through informal
trusts, grievances resolved case by case as a matter of conscience rather
than fixed equitable interest.65
The observation that equitable property implicates the assertion
of (equitable) claims against (legal) rights can be generalized, for most
of supplemental equity consists in obligations or entitlements that
condition the enforcement or exercise of legal rights, powers, and
permissions.66 In each case, the adjectival orientation of supplemental
equity is encased in a structural relationship of asymmetric reference,
with equity having permanently altered law in pivoting from correction
to supplementation. Hence, even in respect of supplemental equity,
to view law and equity as a “fused” whole consisting of so many “causes
of action” is to ignore equity’s basic structure and functional
orientation toward law. It is also to ignore the normative lessons taught
by equity’s impulse to correct law, whether ad hoc or permanently.
D. Distinctive Characteristics of Equity Pleading
One hundred and fifty years of procedural fusion has been
presented as a legacy that tells of equity’s triumph over law.67 One
consequence is a blurring of lines between substance and procedure
that were intended (however implausibly) to be maintained. Another
consequence is a loss of awareness of the symbiosis between the
distinctive characteristics of equity pleading and the distinctive
characteristics of the substantive bases of suits in equity. The casualness with which we invoke “cause of action” as a generic descriptor of
how one gets into law or equity suggests as much.
As noted earlier, whereas one generally gets into law by asserting
the actual or imminent interference with a primary right—that is, a
completed or threatened civil wrong—one generally gets into

65 Smith, supra note 15, at 1099 & nn.189–90 (citing several scholars).
66 See Ben McFarlane & Robert Stevens, What’s Special about Equity? Rights about Rights,
in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF EQUITY 191 (Dennis Klimchuk, Irit Samet,
& Henry E. Smith eds., 2020); Henry T. Terry, Legal Duties and Rights, 12 YALE L.J. 185, 208
(1903).
67 See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 17.
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corrective equity by stating a grievance that equity recognizes or might
recognize as within its jurisdiction. Equity pleading is historically
distinguished above all else by two things: its relative informality as to
the elements of pleadings and their juridical specificity,68 and the
priority placed on comprehensive presentation of factual evidence
(including, but not limited to, oral or written depositions) that are
germane to the petitioner’s grievance.69 One cannot understand
contemporary equity and its distinctive characteristics without
understanding equity’s history and, in particular, the ways in which
equity was understood by its practitioners to be situated adjectivally
relative to law.
Equity began as an emanation of the prerogative power and
responsibility claimed by the English monarch to render justice to his
68 See BAKER, supra note 23, at 112 (“Pleading was in English and, although commonlaw phraseology was adopted where convenient, it was free from undue technicality. There
was no need for a single issue.”); JONES, supra note 2, at 16 (“The character of the bill is
determined by the nature of the grievance stated and the relief prayed, and not by the
choice of words employed in its statement.”); JOSEPH H. KOFFLER & ALISON REPPY,
HANDBOOK OF COMMON LAW PLEADING 20–21 (1969) (“In framing his statement of a cause
of action in what was called a ‘Bill in Equity’ as opposed to a ‘Declaration at Law’, the
plaintiff followed no set Form of Action, as at Common Law, but proceeded upon the
[broad] equities involved in the controversy, and stated the Facts at large, mingling both
Questions of Fact and of Law, there being no need to separate them on the Record as at
Law, since they were both to be decided by the Chancellor . . . .”); Main, supra note 10, at
457 (“Whereas the common law over-emphasized form, chancery historically had eschewed
it. There were no forms of action nor emphasis upon the formation of a single issue . . . .”
(footnotes omitted)).
69 United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 746 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750)
(Story, Circuit J.) ("In equity causes, the decree was necessarily shaped in many instances
by a minute inquiry into facts, and the result of the evidence, as well as the propriety of
relief, were questions almost inseparably connected.”); BAKER, supra note 23, at 111 (“In
exercising his informal jurisdiction the chancellor was free from the rigid procedures under
which inconveniences and injustices sheltered, because he was free to delve into the facts
at large.”); W.S. Holdsworth, The Relation of the Equity Administered by the Common Law Judges
to the Equity Administered by the Chancellor, 26 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1916) (“In modern law a salient
difference between the procedure in an action at law and the procedure in a suit in equity
consisted in the fact that, in an action at law, the proceedings were . . . based upon a legal
right which the plaintiff asserted had been infringed; while, in a suit in equity, the
proceedings . . . were based upon facts which made it just and equitable that the plaintiff
should get the remedy or relief which he sought.”); Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main,
The Integration of Law and Fact in an Uncharted Parallel Procedural Universe, 79 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1981, 1989 (2004) (“[T]he broad substantive mandate of Equity focused the court
on an integrated story of law and fact in a manner that demonstrated that the story was not
remediable by the law courts.” (footnote omitted)). On the inquisitorial posture of judges
within equity, see Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process,
and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1183 (2005) (“As
late as the nineteenth century, Anglo-American courts of equity . . . employed a mode of
procedure, which like that used in the courts of continental Europe, derived from the
Roman-canon tradition and thus was significantly inquisitorial.”).
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subjects.70 Ordinarily, the responsibility of the Crown to render justice
was met through provision of laws and through their administration by
the royal courts, and hence through the exercise of devolved judicial
power.
However, where laws or their administration proved
inadequate—that is, inequitable or unjust—in a particular case, the
Crown retained residual prerogative power and even responsibility to
hear subjects’ grievances, and, where warranted, to dispense to
complainants a more perfect justice.71 This dispensation could enable
a more perfect justice inasmuch as it supplied a morally sound
resolution of whatever particular injustice or inequity was caused or
left unaddressed by law. The King could hear grievances and dispense
equity personally, but it became customary to refer these subjects to
the Lord Chancellor—an important senior advisor to the Crown and
officer of the state who, in medieval England, was ordinarily a bishop
responsible for spiritual advisement of the Crown and thus referred to
as Keeper of the King’s Conscience.72
Regardless of how and by whom they were heard, it was universally
understood from equity’s inception that grievances were entertained
in equity entirely outside of the ambit of law and its institutional
apparatus, and that any relief that might be awarded would be extralegal, even though it might have clear implications for law (e.g., by
suspending its usual effect in a given case).73 The specialized language
70 BAKER, supra note 23, at 106 (“By the end of the thirteenth century numerous
petitions (or ‘bills’) were being presented to the king, asking for his grace to be shown in
respect of some complaint. . . . [I]n the exceptional cases where the king or the Council
took some direct action, we can see the beginning of the newer jurisdictions in which suits
were not only commenced by bill but did not follow the due process of the common law.”);
HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 3 (2d ed. 1948) (1936).
71 Frierson, supra note 52, 135–36.
72 See the description of the office in MEAGHER, GUMMOW AND LEHANE’S EQUITY
DOCTRINES & REMEDIES 5 (J.D. Heydon, M.J. Leeming & P.G. Turner eds., 5th ed. 2015):
In the first period of equity, the mediaeval period . . . . [equity] centred around
the person of the Lord Chancellor . . . . His position was unique. He was the head
of the King’s Council; ‘the King’s natural prime minister’; the source of enormous
ecclesiastical patronage; the head of the Chancery, which by 1300 had become a
great department of state; the keeper of the Great Seal, ‘a transcendent,
multifarious and indefinable office’; and the possessor of a multitude of other
heads of power.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (first quoting with alteration T.F. TOUT, THE PLACE OF THE REIGN
OF EDWARD II IN ENGLISH HISTORY 58 (1914); and then quoting with alteration Jeremy
Bentham, Draft of Plan for Judicial Establishment in France (1789), as reprinted in JOSEPH
PARKES, A HISTORY OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY 436, 437 (London, Longman, Rees, Orme,
Brown & Green 1828)).
73 MCCLINTOCK, supra note 70, at 10 (“During the period of the ecclesiastical
chancellors, equity was regarded more as an administrative function of the executive than
as a judicial system administered by a different court.”); see also BAKER, supra note 23, at 107
(“In origin [the Chancery] was not a court of law but a department of state . . . .”).
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employed in early equity reflects the distinctiveness both of substantive
bases of equitable intervention and of equitable procedure.
Complainants were not understood to bring an action at law precisely
because they had no recourse or inadequate recourse at law. Instead,
and consistent with equity’s origins in exercise of prerogative powers
of the Crown, statements of grievances were referred to as petitions,
persons bringing them as petitioners, and person(s) impugned and
compelled to answer to them as respondents. Unlike actions brought in
law through the royal courts, petitions presented to the Crown sought
some exceptional relief from the King , directly or via the monarch’s
appointed representative (i.e., the Lord Chancellor).
Early in equity’s history, there were two kinds of petition that
might be presented, namely petitions of right and petitions of grace.74
Only one of them is relevant here, but their pairing as species of a
genera is instructive of their relationship to law—that is, both can be
thought of as avenues for relief where an adequate remedy could not
be found at law.
Petitions of right prayed that the Crown permit action on legal
claims against it that would lie as a matter of course against an ordinary
subject but which could not be brought in the royal courts without
permission (because of sovereign immunity and the structural
inferiority of jurisdiction vested in the courts). Put simply, petitioners
of right asked—not demanded, the latter being an impossibility—that
the Crown answer to law by signaling its willingness to accept liability on
terms established by general law.75
By contrast, petitions of grace were made not against but of the
Crown; they were requests of a personal nature, for grace and favor to
be shown by the Crown in direct resolution of a conflict or concern, or
for provision of a benefit. As Professor J.K. Johnson has shown, the
English Crown heard all manner of petitions of grace—including
requests for jobs, money, and land—but prominent among them were
petitions for the resolution of grievances in equity.76
Note the meaning and connotations of the language used to
describe grievances brought in equity. The language of petition is
important, and contrasts sharply with later language of claim and cause.
74 For analysis, see Ludwik Ehrlich, Petitions of Right, 45 L.Q. REV. 60, 69–75 (1929).
On the differences between the Latin and English sides of Chancery, with the petitions of
right being in the former, see BAKER, supra note 23, at 108–110.
75 See W.S. Holdsworth, The History of Remedies Against the Crown, Pt I, 38 L.Q. REV. 141,
149 (1922) (“[I]f a petitioner asks simply for his ‘droit’ or legal right, he must establish that
legal right in a manner similar to that in which it must be established in an ordinary
action. . . . To a petition of right there must always be a reply: ‘Let right be done.’”); see also
W.S. Holdsworth, The History of Remedies Against the Crown, Pt II, 38 L.Q. REV. 280 (1922).
76 See J.K. Johnson, “Claims of Equity and Justice”: Petitions and Petitioners in Upper Canada
1815–1840, 28 SOC. HIST. 219, 220 (1995); see also MCCLINTOCK, supra note 70, at 47.
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The latter may be asserted but the former is merely brought.77 Notice,
too, associated language evocative of the piteous (rather than
righteous) posture of the petitioner in equity and the magnanimity or
charity asked of the Crown. The petitioner seeks the grace and favor of
the Crown or its delegate in the resolution of a grievance, and does so
by praying for relief from or in spite of the law because the latter affords
him no adequate remedy.78 (To be sure, this posture of supplication
was not, in the late medieval period, unique to equity, yet equity
retained this strong petitionary quality in its pleadings long after it
ceased to exert influence on the law.)
A petitioner pleading in equity thus recognized the exceptional
nature of equitable intervention and the robust discretion that would
be exercised in determining whether a grievance was heard, not to
mention in relation to any subsequent investigation, hearing, and
dispensation. The petitioner in early equity sought the indulgence—
again, by way of grace and favor79—of a hearing and asked for a fair or
just resolution of the grievance pled. Written petitions replete with
references to natural law and precepts of Christian morality were
meant to summon the conscience of the Crown to the petitioner’s aid,
while also implicating the conscience of the petitioner and respondent.80 Grace, if it was deemed warranted, was supplied through some
exceptional relief responsive to the circumstances of the petitioner’s
grievance, subsequent to investigation of those circumstances and
examination of the conscience of the parties.
As one would expect of petitions before the Crown but beyond
law and its baroque institutional apparatus, written submissions stating
a grievance in equity originally defied convention as to content and
format.81 They were sometimes prepared by subjects without the
assistance or advice of lawyers. They were written in plain terms with

77 See Holdsworth, The History of Remedies Against the Crown, Pt I, supra note 75, at 142
(commenting on “that large genus ‘petition,’ by which remedies could be sought . . . which
were wholly outside anything that could be given by the existing forms of action”).
78 MCCLINTOCK, supra note 70, at 50 (“The early bills were in the form of humble
petitions for a favor, not for relief to which the law entitled them.”).
79 Holdsworth, The History of Remedies Against the Crown, Pt I, supra note 75, at 149
(“[T]o a petition of grace there is merely an assent or a refusal and no judgement, ‘because
the ordinary course of the common law is not pursued.’”) (citation omitted).
80 For discussion, see Margaret Center Klingelsmith, Early Bills in Equity, 71 U. PA. L.
REV. 115, 119 (1923) (noting the following invocations in bills of eyre, close antecedents of
bills in equity: “‘For God’s sake,’ ‘For the love of Jesus Christ,’ ‘For God’s sake and the soul
of the queen,’ are common”).
81 MCCLINTOCK, supra note 70, at 27 (“In the early years, pleading and practice in the
court of chancery were very informal; the bill was evidently drawn by the complainant
himself and conformed to no technical rules of pleading.”).
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minimal or no use of legal terms of art.82 Because these grievances
took no general form, they were merely described factually. Furthermore, written submissions usually made a general request for relief in
the name of charity, justice, and mercy, without specifying a particular
remedy. And, finally, they often appealed explicitly to the conscience
of the Crown, recognizing and invoking the monarch’s power to see to
the realization of God’s will that natural justice be served where it was
wanting at law.83
Here is an example of a short bill in eyre (the latter being
regarded as an antecedent of early bills in equity84):
Alice, the daughter of Piers Knotte of Shrewsbury, maketh
complaint to the Justices of our lord the King of Mabel that was wife
of Richard of Berwick for that the same Mabel wrongfully
withholdeth from her the rent of a messuage in Shrewsbury, being
one penny and a halfpenny for each year, and hath withheld this
rent for these twelve years past. Of this she prayeth remedy for
God’s sake, an it please you, and for the Queen’s soul’s sake. For
God’s sake, Sir Justice, think of me, for I have none to help me save
God and you.85

82 Cf. Garrard Glenn & Kenneth Redden, Equity: A Visit to the Founding Fathers, 31 VA.
L. REV. 753, 773 (1945) (“The plaintiffs wrote in the vernacular, be it remembered, for they
presented petitions, not pleadings as in the common law . . . .”).
83 What Bolland says of bills of eyre holds true of early bills in equity:
These bills were an appeal over the head of the law to the paternal powers, so to,
speak, of the King as father of his people, put where he was, to quote Bracton
again, to serve as God’s vicar on earth, to judge between right and wrong, to see
that all his subjects bore themselves uprightly and honestly, that none harmeth
another, that every man kept unimpaired that which was rightly his.
WILLIAM CRADDOCK BOLLAND, THE GENERAL EYRE 75–77 (1922).
84 William Craddock Bolland, Introduction to 7 SELDEN SOCIETY YEAR BOOKS OF
EDWARD II: THE EYRE OF KENT, 6 & 7 EDWARD II, A.D. 1313–1314, at xxviii–xxix (William
Craddock Bolland, Frederic William Maitland & Leveson William Vernon Harcourt eds.,
1912) (“I think that there can be no doubt that these bills are the very beginning of the
equitable jurisdiction.”). For discussion, see George Burton Adams, The Origin of English
Equity, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 87, 88 (1916) (“The bills in Eyre are in form and purport so
nearly like the later Chancery bills that both Sir Frederick Pollock and Dr. Hazeltine are
inclined to regard the Chancery bills as descended from them.”).
85 SELDEN SOCIETY, SELECT BILLS IN EYRE, A.D. 1292–1333, at 2 (William Craddock
Bolland ed., 1914). Here is an illustrative example of a fifteenth-century bill in equity:
To the most reverend and worshipful Father in God, my Lord Cardinal
Archbishop of Canterbury and Chancellor of England:
Meekly beseecheth your orator, John Brown, cousin and heir of Walter
Sherington, clerk, that whereas the said Walter and others were seized of manors,
lands, tenements, rents, and possessions in the shire of Kent, to the use and
behoof of the said Walter and his heirs; and being so seized, (said Walter) died
without any will thereof (viz., of said real estate) declared; after whose decease
James Fenys, (who was) then the Lord Say, by great cunning and malice
aforethought, set about to buy the said manors, lands and tenements, rents and
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Of course, equity pleading changed substantially over centuries.
It left behind such informal pleading by unrepresented petitioners,
who employed colloquial language to invoke biblical morality with the
aim of awakening the conscience of a sovereign viewed as the fount of
earthly justice. Gradually, in tandem with the development of equity’s
institutional framework and doctrines, informal and eventually formal
principles of equity pleading developed as well.
Thus, with time, short petitions lacking fixed structure came to be
replaced by bills of complaint with a consistent structure, such that by
the eighteenth century an original bill of complaint in equity had
several subparts, might be supplemented by a secondary bill, and
would usually result in prolix cross-submissions between the petitioner
and respondent (chiefly, demurrer, answer, demurrer to answer, reply,
and demurrer to the reply). In turn, heightened complexity and
experience led to the proliferation of templates for original bills and
other submissions. Specialization in pleadings meant that what was
once an almost impossibly simple process of stating a grievance
became cumbersome, intricate, and costly.
Notwithstanding the drafting complexity associated with later
equity pleading, some of its distinctive characteristics have enduring
significance.86 Its features dovetail with and reflect the distinctive
characteristics of substantive bases of equity suits. More specifically, a
complaint seeking relief in equity—we can now dispense with the
language of a “bill of complaint”—continues to be focused on
presentation of grievances and specifying requests for relief. It is not
focused on the delineation of wrongs and demands for remedies as of
possessions from the co[-]feoffees of the said Walter; and after he had got that
far, then he, against all right and conscience, caused your said beseecher to be
imprisoned until the time when your said beseecher, by (force of) great duress
and against his will (executed a re-lease of his interest in said property). And
afterwards the said Lord Say, knowing that he was about to be put to death by that
horrible and cruel traitor Jack Cade, openly acknowledged among other
extortions this matter, requiring and charging a chaplain called Thomas Oldhall,
then acting as his confessor, that he should urgently press the matter upon (do
his faithful labour to) the wife of the said Lord Say (so) that your said beseecher
speedily might have restitution and reformation of the said wrongs and
oppressions in this matter to him done. May it please, therefore, your gracious
lordship to grant a writ of subpoena directed to the said N to appear before your
good lordship, and there to be examined in aid of your beseecher toward the
righting of his said wrongs, for the love of God and in the way of charity.
Glenn & Redden, supra note 82, at 765–66 (translating into modern English from John
Broun v. The Widow of James Lord Say, in 1 CALENDARS OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN CHANCERY, IN
THE REIGN OF QUEEN ELIZABETH xlvii, xlvii (London, House of Commons 1827)).
86 Cf. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 70, at 21 (noting that Chancery’s “system of
procedure, . . . in time, became very complex and dilatory, but” it still “differed
fundamentally from the common law system”).
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right, at least in corrective equity. While a legal cause of action has
elements that are necessary and sufficient to plead a claim, equity’s
reasons for intervention are such that there is no necessary and
sufficient list of elements.
E. The Centrality of Remedies
It has frequently been observed that remedies have had a central
role in the development of equity jurisdiction,87 and for good reason.
At equity’s inception, the injustice of being denied an adequate
remedy at law led subjects to bring their petitions to the Crown or the
Lord Chancellor. The petitioners of early equity were not merely
seeking to be heard, much less were they seeking a public airing of
disputes; hearings were often informal and in camera, initiated simply
in hope of a just resolution. Petitioners sought to awaken the
conscience of the Crown or the Crown’s delegate, marshalling the
monarch’s prerogative power to compel respondents to pay, perform,
stand by, or otherwise accept a limitation on their rights or powers on
pain of imprisonment for contempt.
The priority of remedies in early equity is evident from the
content of petitions placed before the Chancery. Petitioners’ pleas
were utterly lacking formality as to the substantive bases of intervention
and prayers for relief, since their grievances were not defined by law
and were not yet categorizable by description or characterization in
equity. Recognizing that any relief to be afforded was discretionary
and exceptional, requests for relief were put piteously and left openended. Petitioners prayed for a just, fair, or equitable remedial resolution of a specific problem, again invoking the Crown’s power and
responsibility for dispensing justice that cannot be realized through
law.
As noted earlier, equity pleadings eventually increased in
formality and drafting practices accordingly came to require lawyerly
specialization. These developments reflected, in part, the expansion
and development of equitable substantive and remedial doctrine.
Thus, with time, it became possible and important to specify particular
grievances recognizable in equity and to request particular forms of
available equitable relief, even as pleadings continued to emphasize
87 See, e.g., Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105 (1945) (noting that the “system of
equity ‘derived its doctrines, as well as its powers, from its mode of giving relief’” (quoting
C.C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF EQUITY PLEADING xxvii (1877))); D.E.C. Yale, Introduction
to LORD NOTTINGHAM’S “MANUAL OF CHANCERY PRACTICE” AND “PROLEGOMENA OF
CHANCERY AND EQUITY” 16 (D.E.C. Yale ed., 1965) (c. 1674) (citing C.C. Langdell, A Brief
Survey of Equity Jurisdiction, 1 HARV. L. REV. 55 (1887), reprinted in C.C. LANGDELL, A BRIEF
SURVEY OF EQUITY JURISDICTION 1, 1 (2d ed. 1908) (1904)) (“Equity is essentially a system
of remedies.”).
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detailed narration and so, in this sense, prioritized substance over
form. However, it is telling that here, too, it was judicial practice and
doctrinal development in relation to remedies that often fed
downstream development of substantive doctrine. As the chancellors
gained experience in crafting and ordering discretionary remedies,
they came to recognize patterns and to elicit principles, standards, and
other ways in which to loosely formalize grievances short of stipulation
of a conduct rule (e.g., a right, duty, power, or liability). And where
corrective equity gave way to supplemental equity, the Chancery began
to displace loosely characterized grievances with the formulation of
equitable obligations, powers, and liabilities.
Although the priority of remedies to substantive doctrine seems
backward from the vantage point of civil lawyers and the Romanistic
reconstruction of the common law, it is sensible when situated in light
of equity’s history as a system of adjectival law. It is only in agreeing to
hear and intervene in the face of inarticulate or colloquially articulated
grievances, and in coming to hear them in bulk, that the Chancery
could develop doctrine through processes of analogical reasoning that
typify all judge-made law.
Given that equitable intervention was, and is, remedies-focused, it
should be unsurprising that remedies are (with limited exceptions88)
the locus of complexity in equity pleadings and doctrine. Equitable
remedies, unlike legal remedies, tend to be specific rather than
substitutional, consistent with equity’s practice of acting on the person
via compulsion.89 They are notoriously adaptable, amenable of being
tailored to meet the circumstances giving rise to the equity in the
petitioner.90 For that reason, they can be more time and resourceintensive to administer.91 And given that specific relief is generally not
available at law, litigants’ appetite for equitable relief motivates suits
and has necessitated limiting doctrines, including the modestly
limiting effect of a requirement to stipulate in pleadings the grievances
that provide a substantive basis for access to equitable remedies.92
Given the reasons for equity’s grievances remaining open-textured,
and the demand for equitable remedies, courts with equitable powers
have for centuries sought to limit equitable jurisdiction in the name of
88 An example is the byzantine mass of substantive doctrine found in trust law, which
enabled its remarkable adaptability and integration with surrounding law (especially
property, contract, family, inheritance, charities, tax and bankruptcy law).
89 Ralph E. Kharas, A Century of Law-Equity Merger in New York, 1 SYRACUSE. L. REV.
186, 188 (1949).
90 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200 (1973) (plurality opinion) (citing Brown
v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955)); Woodruff v. N. Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co.
(The Debris Case), 16 F. 25, 29–30 (D. Cal. 1883).
91 See MCCLINTOCK, supra note 70, at 47–48; Bray, supra note 18, at 572–77.
92 For discussion of other limiting principles, see Bray, supra note 18, at 572–86.
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protecting the integrity and stability of first-order law (common law
and legislation). If equity is ever at risk of overstepping, it is because it
offers comparatively attractive remedies on the basis of triggers
(grievances) that are supple and so (ironically) inviting of misuse by
the cunning.93
Equity has multiple mechanisms for regulating access. These
mechanisms can be used to make it more difficult for opportunistic,
remedies-driven petitioners to get into equity. As noted above, its
development of substantive doctrine presents soft constraints. More
importantly, many of equity’s maxims have a direct or indirect
cabining effect, serving as reminders of practices that limit equity
jurisdiction.94 But perhaps the most powerful mechanism is the judge
fluent in equity, one who is mindful that intervention sounding in
corrective equity is meant to be exceptional, and aware that the
cautious exercise of ample discretion is the most important factor in
determining whether equity will be served where it ought to be and
restrained where petitioners ought to be turned back to law.
That is why one of the widely known characteristics of equitable
remedies is so important: namely, that they are robustly discretionary.95
Judges in equity have discretion in determining whether, as a matter
of substantive doctrine, petitioners have “an equity” that warrants
intervention (i.e., that establishes prima facie eligibility for an
equitable remedy) as well as in selecting and tailoring remedies and
providing for compliance with remedial orders.96
Viewed now from the perspective of remedies, one can further
appreciate the muddle generated by the post-fusion assimilation of
equitable with legal “causes of action.” As a matter of law, the
enjoyment of a primary right generates a secondary entitlement to a
remedy upon proof that the right was, in fact, actionably violated (i.e.,
that the right-holder was wronged). Reference to a “cause of action”
is natural and innocent in this context because the plaintiff’s fixed
legal entitlement grounds a settled expectation of a remedy.
But things are different as a matter of corrective equity. Here,
ordinarily, the petitioner has no (reasonable or recognized) settled
expectation of any equitable remedy, much less a particular one, even if
93 On the vulnerability of equitable remedies to opportunistic abuse, see Bray, supra
note 18, at 534, 572–78.
94 See Bray, supra note 18, at 582–86.
95 See Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 551 (1937) (“[T]he extent
to which equity will go to give relief where there is no adequate remedy at law is not a matter
of fixed rule. It rests rather in the sound discretion of the court.”).
96 MCCLINTOCK, supra note 70, at 2 (“[I]t is still true that most of the rules of equity
are characterized by a greater flexibility than those of the common law, and that courts
possess greater discretion in administering equitable remedies than even the same courts
have in administering common-law remedies.”).
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the suit is well founded in that the grievance and record reveal an
equity warranting relief.97 Again, judges in equity have inherent
discretion whether and how to remedy well-founded grievances. In
exercising that discretion soundly, they must look to a range of
considerations that are generally not pertinent to the award of legal
remedies (e.g., the relative equities of the petitioner and respondent
and potentially destabilizing effects on surrounding law). Finally, even
if a petitioner succeeds in securing an equitable remedy, its extent is
subject to discretionary adjustment and tailoring, as well as modification and dissolution as circumstances change.98 All of this is lost in the
linear thinking about the relationship between “wrongs” and
“remedies” encouraged by talk of “causes of action” in equity.
IV.

CONTEMPORARY IMPLICATIONS

Some of the implications of the analysis here are straightforward.
First, and easiest of all, this analysis should encourage courts not
to ask whether there is an “equitable cause of action.” At best, the
expression is subject to misunderstanding, if a court means only that
there is sufficient ground for equitable intervention. More likely, the
expression leads the courts to assimilate the bases for equitable relief
to those of law. The phrase should be retired, and courts should
instead ask whether there is a basis for equitable intervention, or
whether there is equitable jurisdiction, or whether the suit is
cognizable in equity, or whether there are grounds for equitable relief,
and so on. The preceding formulations are effectively identical.
Second, this analysis emphasizes that equity cannot be static.
Grupo Mexicano99 itself recognizes that some development in equity is
necessary,100 and this has long been the position of the Court. For
example, the Court has said: “From the beginning, the phrase ‘suits in
equity’ has been understood to refer to suits in which relief is sought
according to the principles applied by the English court of chancery

97 MCCLINTOCK, supra note 70, at 49 (1948) (“Equitable relief cannot be demanded
as a matter of right whenever specified facts are shown; but is granted in the discretion of
the court, by which is meant a ‘judicial discretion’ to be exercised by applying established
principles of equity to the situation presented by all of the facts in the case, and adapting
the remedy to accomplish the most equitable result possible.”). For an explanation of
substantive doctrine situated in corrective equity, see Neave & Weinberg, supra note 51, at
27 (“The plaintiff in such a case cannot point to a category and assert his right to a remedy
on the basis of such a category. Rather, he must persuade the court to provide a remedy
on the basis of the facts of his particular case.”).
98 See Bray, supra note 18, at 547 n.81, 583.
99 Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999).
100 See Bray, supra note 8, at 1010 n.61.
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before 1789, as they have been developed in the federal courts.”101 The
account given in this Article, especially the argument that equity is
adjectival, supports the argument by James Pfander and Jacob Wentzel
that relief in equity has to change and adjust as the relief in law does.102
If law is not static, the equity that corrects and supplements it cannot
be static either.
Third, the development of equity needs to happen through the
application of traditional equitable principles.
These include
principles of potency, as well as principles of limitation. These
principles about when equity will and will not act are still there, and
they need no specific authorization in order to continue shaping the
equitable claims, defenses, and remedies of the federal courts. This is
perhaps the lesson of the reference to “equity” in Article III of the
Constitution,103 and certainly of the reference to “equity” in the
Judiciary Act of 1789.104 Hence the availability of an equitable remedy
does not need to be tied to a provision of the Bill of Rights or to the
Supremacy Clause.
Fourth, this analysis shows that the texture of equitable principles
and doctrines is different. Law is more likely to have elements in a
cause of action. Equity is more likely to have triggers to permit the
exercise of judicial power,105 along with focal considerations to guide
the exercise of that power.106 And yet even if the trigger is activated,
there is still a residual discretion for equity not to act.107
One application of this point about equity’s texture is that we
should avoid the mistake of thinking that any list of elements or any
multi-factor test will encompass all the considerations for the grant of
an equitable remedy. In other words, there is more to the decision
about a permanent injunction in federal court than simply applying

101 Gordon v. Washington, 295 U.S. 30, 36 (1935).
102 See Pfander & Wentzel, supra note 1. This works in both directions, both with equity
confronting new challenges and with equity no longer needing to act. On the latter, see,
e.g., Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 n.19 (1962) (“It was settled in Beacon
Theatres that procedural changes which remove the inadequacy of a remedy at law may
sharply diminish the scope of traditional equitable remedies by making them unnecessary
in many cases.”); N. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Amacker, 46 F. 233, 236 (C.C.D. Mont. 1891) (“The
perfecting of legal proceedings has often done away with the necessity of a resort to
equitable remedies.”).
103 U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2.
104 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
105 See Smith, supra note 15, at 1084–89. For further discussion of the relationship of
“triggers” and “grievances,” see supra note 44.
106 See Bray, supra note 18, at 584–86.
107 See Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 778 n.116
(1982) (noting a trial court’s “discretion . . . to withhold a permanent injunction as
unnecessary even when the plaintiff has made out all the other elements of his case”).
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eBay v. MercExchange,108 and there is more to a preliminary injunction
than just applying Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council.109
Another application is that the distinctive texture of equitable claims
further strengthens the arguments by John Goldberg and Henry Smith
that equitable grievances, even ones that are routinized, should not be
treated as torts.110
Fifth, this analysis helps illuminate why the Supreme Court’s
equity cases so often tend to merge together considerations of justiciability, merits, and remedy. Other scholars have skillfully analyzed the
interplay of these considerations,111 but in this less equity-conscious age
some may miss that this interplay is different in law and in equity.112
For legal claims, justiciability is a threshold, and once through the door
the plaintiff is able to obtain remedies without much consideration of
whether the plaintiff just barely made it over the threshold. But in
equity it all connects—the broader and deeper the remedy the plaintiff
wants, the stronger the plaintiff’s story needs to be.113 This interplay is
the result of equity’s not having causes of action: the cause of action
delimits the scope and relief in a legal suit, but without that limiting
principle in equity, others are needed. Put differently, this is an
instance of the “paradox at the heart of equitable remedies”: these
remedies give courts the greatest capacity for managing the parties,
and yet courts often decline to issue these remedies precisely “on the
ground that they would require too much management of the

108 547 U.S. 388 (2006). In other words, Mark Gergen, John Golden, and Henry Smith
were right. See Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry E. Smith, The Supreme Court’s
Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 219–30
(2012).
109 555 U.S. 7 (2008).
110 John C.P. Goldberg & Henry E. Smith, Wrongful Fusion: Equity and Tort, in EQUITY
AND LAW, supra note 9, at 309, 310.
111 E.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—and Their
Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633 (2006).
112 For an exception, see Ernest Young, Standing, Equity, and Injury in Fact, 97 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1885 (2022).
113 See, e.g., Paine v. Upton, 87 N.Y. 327, 337 (1882) (Andrews, C.J.) (“The granting or
refusing of equitable relief on the ground of mistake may depend, to some extent, on the
fact whether the contract is executory or executed. The court might very well refuse the
specific performance of a contract for the sale of land, in respect to which a mistake is
alleged, and leave the party to his remedy at law, when it would not interfere, if the contract
had been executed.”). It is no accident that most of the abstention doctrines originate in
equity; these doctrines show how concerns about the merits and the remedies feed back
into abstention ab initio. For discussion and critique, see Kellen Funk, Equity’s Federalism,
97 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2057 (2022); Fred O. Smith, Jr., Abstaining Equally, 97 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 2095 (2022); Lael Weinberger, Frankfurter, Abstention Doctrine, and the
Development of Modern Federalism: A History and Three Futures, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 1737 (2020).
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parties.”114 The fact that equity lacks the rigid boundaries and limits
of law, especially the cause of action, makes this paradox more
intelligible.
Sixth, this analysis is a reminder of why a statute-focused legal
culture makes it harder for lawyers, judges, and scholars to have an
intuitive feel for equity. Equity is the general law par excellence, the law
least likely to be jurisdiction-specific and most likely to have contact
with more general principles of litigation morality and fair play.115 It is
also the law that is most difficult to codify. Yet in the legal culture of
the late-twentieth and early-twenty-first centuries, there is a strong
appetite for demanding a specific legal authorization for every claim,
and so the tendency is to speak of a case like In re Debs as being a
nonstatutory claim.116 That label assumes a statutory claim as the default.
In a legal world with these premises—law is local, law is codified, and
the default is a claim with specific statutory authorization—equity has
to scramble to keep its footing.117
These implications follow rather straightforwardly from the
preceding analysis. But they are also easy because they are unapplied.
To say that traditional equitable principles should govern does not say
what the result should be in cases that are hard or novel.
But even in those cases, the courts should not require a “cause of
action” in equity, but they should consider the scope and intensity of
the remedy in deciding whether there is equitable jurisdiction. One
of the problems with asking whether there is a cause of action in equity
is that it encourages a bifurcation between the “cause of action,” which
can be assessed and adjudicated first, and the “remedy,” which can
then be taken up. But equity does not know that bifurcation. There
is a constant interplay between the question of whether the plaintiff
should be in equity and the question of what the plaintiff wants from
equity.118
CONCLUSION
For two centuries, common lawyers have talked about a “cause of
action.” But what they mean by that has not been constant. One sense
of a cause of action is a legal entitlement to sue, and this is a familiar
and fundamental concept in the common law. But “cause of action”
114 Samuel L. Bray, Remedies, Meet Economics; Economics, Meet Remedies, 38 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 71, 83 (2018).
115 On general law, see Stephen E. Sachs, Finding Law, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 527 (2019).
116 Note, Protecting the Public Interest: Nonstatutory Suits by the United States, 89 YALE L.J.
118 (1979).
117 See, e.g., Andrew Kull, Equity’s Atrophy, 97 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1799 (2022).
118 See, e.g., City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111–13 (1983); Massachusetts v. Mellon,
262 U.S. 447 (1923) (consolidated with Frothingham v. Mellon).
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is not an organizing principle for equity, and to insist on an equitable
cause of action is to work a fundamental change in how a plaintiff gets
into equity. Equity is adjectival, modifying law rather than the other
way around. Remedies, not rights, are what give equity its power. And
for getting into equity, it is the grievance that is central.
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